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BLACKLISTED: SAFE SPORT’S 
DISCIPLINARY POLICY RESTRAINS A 
COACH’S LIVELIHOOD* 
 
 
DANIEL FIORENZA** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine devoting your life to a small Olympic sport and, through your  
reputation, building a career as a coach.  For years, you have created  
world-class athletes.  Parents and athletes around the country hold you in high 
esteem.  Now picture a disgruntled athlete or parentwhose only desire is to 
have the team fire youmaking an allegation of sexual abuse to the newly  
created U.S. Center for Safe Sport (Center).  Under the Center’s procedures, the 
allegation is turned over to the local police.  After a thorough investigation, the 
police rightfully find that the allegation is false and dismiss the complaint.  
However, despite the proper authorities performing a full investigation and  
finding the claim to lack merit, the Center launches its own investigation and 
finds you guilty based solely on “he said, she said” testimony.  Accordingly, the 
Center revokes your membership and issues a lifetime ban. 
Due to the ban and your National Governing Body’s (NGB) rules, the team 
terminates your employment and no club or team in the United States is allowed 
to hire you.  Your only option is to coach privately.  However, due to the NGB 
publishing your name with the allegation on a list of banned members, and the 
NGB’s rule that prohibits banned coaches from interacting with athletes at  
competitions, no parent or athlete will hire you.  As a result, the Center’s  
sanction has effectively “blacklisted” you from your respective sport and your 
career as a coach is over. 
While this scenario is hypothetical, it is not far from reality.  Further, should 
this scenario occur, it is foreseeable that a disciplined coach may claim that the 
Center’s actions are a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.  For this reason, the Center’s disciplinary rules and procedures must be 
analyzed under the Sherman Act. 
This Article will first cover the series of events that brought about the U.S. 
Olympic Committee’s (USOC) creation of the Center.  From there, it will  
explore the proposed procedures for investigating and disciplining coaches  
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accused of sexual abuse.  Next, an analysis will be given regarding section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, including both the per se rule and the rule of reason, and will 
then further explore the application of various disciplinary rules to the Act.   
Finally, the Article will apply section 1 to the Center’s discipline rules and  
procedures, and determine whether a coach could bring a successful section 1 
claim against the Center. 
 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE U.S. CENTER FOR SAFE SPORT 
 
According to Scott Blackmun, CEO of the USOC, about “one in four girls 
and one in six boys will be sexually abused before they turn [eighteen].”1  While 
those national statistics are staggering, Olympic sports are not immune to this 
issue.  In fact, according to Scott Blackmun, “[sexual abuse] happens in sports, 
if not more, than society at large.”2  This can be seen by the decades of sexual 
abuse scandals that have plagued Olympic sports, such as USA Volleyball,3 
USA Swimming,4 USA Gymnastics,5 and US Speedskating6—just to name a 
                                                          
* This Article won the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School’s 2016 
National Sports Law Student Writing Competition. 
** Daniel J. Fiorenza is an Associate Attorney at Lichtsinn & Haensel, S.C. in Milwaukee,  
Wisconsin and has served as a Committee Member for U.S. Speedskating’s Official’s Task Force since 
Spring 2014.  Dan graduated from Marquette University Law School, cum laude, in May 2016. 
1. Wesley G. Pippert, Olympic Committee President Calls Preventing Sexual Abuse Most  
Important Role, NAT’L PRESS CLUB (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.press.org/news-multime-
dia/news/olympic-committee-president-calls-preventing-sexual-abuse-most-important-role. 
2. Id. 
3. See Elliott Almond, She Says She’s Haunted by Coach’s Misconduct: Volleyball: Julie Bremner 
Took Six Years to Come Forward with Her Story of Sexual Abuse, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1995), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/1995-10-19/sports/sp-58618_1_volleyball-officials; Shaun Assael, AAU  
Launches Review of Policies as Volleyball Coach Rick Butler Steps Aside, ESPN (July 28, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/13311608/aau-launches-review-policies-volleyball-coach-rick-
butler-steps-aside. 
4. See Rachel Sturtz, The Sex-Abuse Scandal Plaguing USA Swimming, OUTSIDE, http://www. 
outsideonline.com/o/outdoor-adventure/water-activities/swimming/The-Sex-Abuse-Scandal-Plagu-
ing-USA-Swimming.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2016). 
5. See Matt Bonesteel, USA Gymnastics Routinely Ignored Warnings of Sexual Abuse by Coaches, 
Report Alleges, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/08/04/usa-gymnastics-routinely-ignored-warnings-of-sexual-abuse-by-coaches-report-
alleges/; Amy R. Connolly, Former U.S. Olympics Gymnastic Coach Charged with Child  
Molestation, UPI (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2015/08/25/Former-US-
Olympics-gymnastic-coach-charged-with-child-molestation/5491440514327/; Marisa Kwiatkowski et 
al., Out of Balance: How USA Gymnastics Protected Coaches over Kids, INDYSTAR (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/investigations/2016/08/04/usa-gymnastics-sex-abuse-protected-
coaches/85829732/; Scott M. Reid, USA Gymnastics Tightens Rules on Banned Coaches, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG. (Nov. 9, 2011),  http://www.ocregister.com/articles/gymnastics-326108-boger-
coaches.html. 
6. See Jared S. Hopkins, US Speedskating Completes Andy Gabel Investigation, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 
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few. 
Though these scandals may be unsettling, it should come as no surprise.  
Countless stories, such as Bridie Farrell’s,7 depict that young athletes aspiring 
to make the Olympics will do anything to reach their goals, including  
remaining silent in the face of sexual abuse.  Further, because “[s]exual abuse 
of children is a crime of opportunity[, a]ctivities such as closed practices,  
unsupervised team trips[,] and overnights provide ample opportunity for abuse 
to take place.”8  As a result, sexual predators have been drawn to the amateur 
sports environment and now plague Olympic sports. 
It was not until ESPN and ABC’s coverage of the USA Swimming sexual 
abuse scandal in 2010 that the pandemic of sexual abuse within Olympic sports 
truly came to light and change began to occur.9  Prior to the 2010 investigation, 
the USOC took a hands-off approach to sexual abuse, as the USOC left the  
policy creation and investigation of sexual abuse to each sport’s NGB.10  Thus, 
creating a system where each NGB had its own, if any, sexual abuse policy 
without any oversight by the USOC over how incidents of sexual abuse should 
be handled.   
However, after national publicity and an investigation into USA Swimming, 
the magnitude of the sexual abuse claims within USA Swimming forced the 
USOC, along with USA Swimming, to act.  By May 1, 2014, more than 100 
USA Swimming coaches were identified and issued a lifetime ban.11  Further, 
as of August 8, 2016, the number has grown to over 130,12 “making this one of 
the worst sexual abuse scandals in the U.S. Olympics sports world.”13  While 
the number of USA Swimming coaches banned is astonishing, “[m]any of these 
coaches had well-known, long histories of sexual abuse, yet [USA Swimming] 
                                                          
24, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-24/sports/chi-andy-gabel-us-speedskating-
20140324_1_bridie-farrell-three-time-olympic-speedskater-female-teammate; Michael O’Keeffe & 
Christian Red, Bridie Farrell Says N.Y. Law ‘Doesn’t Protect Children,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 29, 
2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/bridie-farrell-n-y-law-doesn-protect-children-article-
1.2581893. 
7. See O’Keeffe & Red, supra note 6. 
8. Danielle Deak, Comment, Out of Bounds: How Sexual Abuse of Athletes at the Hands of Their 
Coaches Is Costing the World of Sports Millions, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 171, 172–73 (1999). 
9. Megan Chuchmach & Avni Patel, USA Swimming Coaches Molested, Secretly Taped Dozens of 
Teen Swimmers, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/abc-news-investigation-
usa-swimming-coaches-raped-molested/story?id=10322469; Sturtz, supra note 4. 
10. Sturtz, supra note 4. 
11. Id. 
12. Individuals Suspended or Ineligible – Permanently, USA SWIMMING, http://www.usaswim-
ming.org/ViewMiscArticle.aspx?TabId=1963&mid=10011&ItemId=5107 (last updated Aug. 8, 2016). 
13. Sturtz, supra note 4. 
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enabled these men to continue to coach for years.”14   
To respond to the USA Swimming scandal and the lack of NGB oversight, 
in 2012, the USOC implemented the “SafeSport” policy, for every NGB to 
adopt, with its sole purpose “to protect athletes competing under the Olympic 
umbrella from misconduct.”15  Within the policy’s introduction, it broadly states 
that “[a]ll forms of misconduct are intolerable and in direct conflict with the 
Olympic Ideals.”16  From there, the policy identifies and defines six types of 
misconduct (including sexual misconduct); provides reporting and investigation 
procedures; and establishes adjudication and discipline procedures for all  
forty-seven NGBs of the USOC to adopt and follow.17 
Although the SafeSport policy was a big step forward for the USOC in  
tackling the sexual abuse culture within Olympic sports, the USOC recognized 
that in order for the SafeSport policy to be truly effective, claims would need to 
be investigated and enforced by an entity that is independent from any NGB, or 
even the USOC.  Thus, in June 2014, the USOC’s board of directors approved 
the creation of the Center.  In announcing its creation, Scott Blackmun stated: 
 
[T]here is no national agency today that is responsible for the 
safety and well-being of young athletes and we're in position to 
lead this important effort. . . .  [T]he National Center for Safe 
Sport will help fill that vacuum by providing training and  
resources, promoting open dialogue and conducting  
investigations on a national level.18 
 
To launch the Center, the USOC announced that it will make the initial  
financial contribution, and after the first year, it will then be funded by  
contributions from every NGB.19  Further, the USOC announced that  
                                                          
14. Id. 
15. Paul J. Greene, How the USOC’s SafeSport Policies Are Tackling Athlete Abuse and  
Harassment, LAWINSPORT (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/how-the-usoc-s-
safesport-policies-are-tackling-athlete-abuse-and-harassment. 
16. Id. (citation omitted); U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., SAFESPORT POLICIES ii, 
http://cdn.lawinsport.com/pdf/090712_USOC_Safe_Sport_Policy_FINAL.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 
2016). 
17. Greene, supra note 15; U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 16. 
18. Greene, supra note 15 (citation omitted); U.S. Olympic Comm., U.S. Olympic Committee  
Announces Formation of U.S. Center for Safe Sport Advisory Council, TEAMUSA (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.teamusa.org/News/2015/February/09/US-Olympic-Committee-Announces-Formation- 
Of-US-Center-For-Safe-Sport-Advisory-Council. 
19. U.S. Olympic Comm., supra note 18.  However, it is unclear at this moment how much  
financing each NGB must contribute—contribution based on the size of an NGB’s gross operating 
revenue or a flat rate contribution. 
FIORENZA 27.1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2016  5:57 PM 
2016] SAFE SPORT’S DISCIPL INARY POLICY  117 
participation in the Center will be mandatory for all forty-seven NGBs, as  
membership in the USOC will be conditioned on an NGB’s participation in the 
entity.20 
 
III. U.S. CENTER FOR SAFE SPORT PROCEDURES 
 
Since the Center will not be fully operational until early 2017, and no  
official procedures for investigation and enforcement have been released, no 
one knows definitively how it will operate.  However, for the purpose of this 
Article, it will be assumed that the Center will follow similar procedures as those 
established by the current SafeSport policy.  Further, it will also be assumed that 
each of the forty-seven NGBs, and their members, will contractually agree to 
give the Center exclusive jurisdiction over investigation and discipline of sexual 
misconduct. 
 
a. Filing Requirements 
 
Under the assumption that the Center will follow similar procedures as the 
current SafeSport policy, a SafeSport complaint may be filed with the Center by 
any individual, including NGB and non-NGB members.21  Further, since the 
current SafeSport policy does not provide a statute of limitations for filing a 
complaint, an individual may file a complaint at any time, including for  
sexual misconduct that occurred decades prior.22 
While the lack of a statute of limitations may increase the number of  
complaints that the Center receives, and the risk that an innocent coach will be 
disciplined for a decade-old accusation, this increase will be softened by two 
rules that are designed to prevent false accusations.  First, given the gravity a 
sexual abuse accusation can have on a coach’s reputation, the new procedures 
will prohibit individuals from filing a complaint in bad faith, and make it a  
separate ground for disciplinary action.23  Second, since sexual abuse  
allegations are also criminal in nature, the new procedures will require any  
individual filing a complaint of sexual abuse to also file the same complaint 
with local law enforcement.24  By including both of these rules in the filing 
                                                          
20. Id.; see Mel Paramasivan, Including Athletes is Key to Addressing Safeguarding in Sport, 
SPORTANDDEV (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.sportanddev.org/en/article/news/including-athletes-key-
addressing-safeguarding-sport.  This requirement was unanimously endorsed by the NGB Council in 
2013.  U.S. Olympic Comm., supra note 18. 
21. U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 16, at 3, 12. 
22. See U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., supra note 16. 
23. Id. at 14. 
24. Id. at 13.  Thus, subjecting the individual to possible criminal charges for filing a false report if 
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procedures, the Center aims to reduce the risk that an innocent coach is  
disciplined and prevented from earning a living.  
 
b. Investigation 
 
Upon filing an accusation, local law enforcement’s criminal investigation 
will be given priority and the Center will suspend its investigation until the  
criminal investigation, if any, is completed.  However, if there is a “reasonable 
belief” that the alleged sexual misconduct did occur, the coach may be  
suspended immediately pending final resolution of both law enforcement and 
the Center’s investigation.25  Although this interim suspension—pending final 
outcome—is for the protection of minor children and can be appealed by the 
coach to the American Arbitration Association (AAA),26 it prevents a coach 
from earning a living based solely on a belief of guilt, and can ruin a coach’s 
reputation even if the suspension is lifted.  Further, despite local law  
enforcement’s decision not to prosecute due to lack of evidence, the Center may 
continue with its own investigation. 
 
c. Hearing 
 
After completing an investigation, the Center will hold a hearing if the  
complaint is deemed credible.27  While the accused coach may appear in-person 
for the hearing, the hearing will be held primarily through written briefs, without 
witnesses or live testimony.  Unlike the current SafeSport policy, the evidence 
gathered during an investigation, along with written briefs, will be  
administratively reviewed by only one individual, the hearing officer.28  The 
hearing officer will act similar to an administrative law judge and will determine 
guilt based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.29   
Since a determination of guilt would ruin a coach’s reputation and bar him 
from coaching, it is also assumed that the Center will adopt similar procedural 
due process guarantees as those provided under the current SafeSport policy.30  
Thus, the Center will be required to inform the coach of the sexual abuse  
allegation and the evidence brought against him, and provide him with a  
                                                          
the individual makes a SafeSport complaint in bad faith.  Id. at 14. 
25. Id. at 15. 
26. Id. at 16. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (instructing that a hearing be held by a panel). 
29. Id. at 18. 
30. Id. at 17. 
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reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegation.31  Further, although the 
hearing is primarily performed through written briefs, the coach will have the 
right to be represented by legal counsel at his expense.32  Lastly, in applying the 
current SafeSport policy, the coach will also have a right to a decision by a 
hearing officer, who is unbiased and free of conflicts of interests, and a right to 
appeal any decision rendered.33 
 
d. Discipline 
 
If the allegation of sexual misconduct is proven by the preponderance of the 
evidence, the Center will be required to impose a “proportionate and  
reasonable” sanction.34  The sanctions available to the Center are very broad, 
and range from a warning to a permanent suspension and expulsion from the 
sport and its facilities.35   
While the factors for determining which sanction to impose for sexual  
misconduct are unknown at this time, there are several factors that the current 
SafeSport policy utilizes,36 which the Center may adopt.  Based on the 
SafeSport policy, the hearing officer will be required to consider: 
 
a) The legitimate interest of the USOC in providing a safe  
environment for its participants[;] 
b) The seriousness of the offense or act[;] 
c) The age of the accused individual and alleged victim when 
the offense or act occurred[;] 
d) Any information produced by the accused individual, or  
produced on behalf of the individual, in regard to the  
individual’s rehabilitation and good conduct[;] 
e) The effect on the USOC’s reputation[;] 
f) Whether the individual poses an ongoing concern for the 
safety of the USOC’s athletes and participants[; and] 
g) Any other information, which in the determination of the 
Panel, bears on the appropriate sanction[.]37   
                                                          
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 16–17. 
33. Id. at 16. 
34. Id. at 18. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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After weighing the above factors, the hearing officer will issue a  
“proportionate and reasonable” sanction that the coach can appeal to AAA.38  
Lastly, in addition to the entire investigation and hearing process being  
confidential, the hearing officer’s decision will also remain confidential until 
the coach has exhausted his right to appeal.39  After that time, the decision will 
be published for all members to see. 
 
IV. SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
 
As discussed above, the Center will be empowered by all forty-seven NGBs 
with the power to expel and permanently ban coaches from their respective 
sport, and effectively restrain them from earning a living in their profession.  
Due to this restraint, it is important to explore section 1 of the Sherman Act to 
discover whether the Center’s exercise of such power is an illegal restraint of 
trade. 
 
a. Framework 
 
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”40  
However, for a restraint of trade to be found illegal, courts have judicially  
interpreted section 1 to require that the restraint be unreasonable.41  Thus, to 
prevail on a section 1 claim under the Sherman Act, an accused coach must 
prove that: (1) the Center participated in an agreement, (2) the agreement  
unreasonably restrained trade, and (3) the agreement affects interstate trade.42    
As for the first element of a section 1 claim, since all NGBs will be  
required to contractually agree to the jurisdiction and authority of the Center, as 
well as uphold and enforce any sanction imposed, the requirement that the  
Center participate in an agreement that restrains trade will be met.  As for the 
third element, some courts have held that for this element to be satisfied, the 
correct inquiry is whether the rule is commercial and regulates commercial  
                                                          
38. Id. at 19. 
39. Id. at 18. 
40. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016). 
41. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
42. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1016; Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 
(C.D. Cal. 1971). 
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activity,43 rather than “whether the entity promulgating the rule is  
commercial.”44  Of the cases that have applied this standard, the courts were 
addressing certain NCAA rules—eligibility, recruiting, etc.—that sought to  
preserve amateurism and integrity in college sports.45   
However, this standard has not been fully adopted by all courts as a number 
of courts have disagreed and held NCAA rules that affect compensation satisfy 
the third element.46  Thus, the Center’s rules most likely will be found distinct 
from the NCAA rules because the Center seeks to regulate the commercial  
profession of coaching, unlike the NCAA’s regulation of unpaid amateur  
athletes.  Further, since all NGBs conduct business and hold competitions  
nationally, and the Center will have national jurisdiction to conduct its  
investigations and expel members, the interstate commerce requirement will 
most likely be met. 
Lastly, as for the second element, although a lifetime ban by the Center 
would prevent a coach from coaching and restrain him from earning a living, 
that restraint must be unreasonable to be illegal.  Thus, the question then turns 
on whether the restraint is an unreasonable restraint, which requires an in-depth 
analysis.  To determine whether the Center’s conduct unreasonably restrains 
trade, a court may apply one of two approaches: the per se rule or the rule of 
reason.47 
 
1. Per Se 
 
In determining whether to apply the per se rule, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that this approach may only be invoked “when [the] surrounding  
circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to  
render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”48  While this 
standard for application is strict, the U.S. Supreme Court issued this restriction 
on applying the per se rule because once the Center’s conduct is identified as 
illegal per se, a court would not need to examine how the Center’s enforcement 
                                                          
43. See Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008); Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, 
Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185–86 (3d Cir. 
1998); Pennsylvania v. NCAA, 948 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424–28 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Pocono  
Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
44. Bassett, 528 F.3d at 433 (citing Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc., 388 F.3d at 959). 
45. Bassett, 528 F.3d at 433; Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc., 388 F.3d at 959; Smith, 
139 F.3d at 185–86; Pennsylvania, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 424–28; Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc., 
317 F. Supp. 2d at 584. 
46. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104–13; O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 
2015); Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
47. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
48. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04. 
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impacts a NGB’s coaching market or the procompetitive justifications for the 
Center’s decision to expel a coach.49   
 Although the application of the per se rule is restricted, and most courts 
apply the rule of reason to determine the legality of conduct in the sports  
industry, courts have applied the per se rule in a sports context when the  
conduct amounts to a group boycott.50  This can be seen in Blalock v. Ladies  
Professional Golf Ass’n, where a professional golfer was suspended by the  
executive board of the Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) for  
allegedly illegally moving her ball during a tournament.51  At the time of the 
executive board’s decision, the board consisted of several members that were 
also professional golf players that competed against the suspended player.52  
The suspended player argued that the board’s decision constituted a concerted 
refusal to deal, and thus, an illegal group boycott in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.53   
In considering the player’s section 1 claim, the court first noted that before 
a concerted refusal to deal can be illegal, “two threshold elements must be  
present: (1) there must be some effect on ‘trade or commerce among the  
several States’, and (2) there must be sufficient agreement to constitute a  
‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.’”54  However, since the LPGA  
conducted business and tournaments nationally, and prohibited its members 
through contracts (the LPGA’s constitution and by-laws) not to deal with a  
suspended player, the court held that both threshold elements were met.55 
With the threshold met, the court then addressed the legality of a group  
boycott as applied to a sports organization.  In considering the player’s group 
boycott argument, the court noted that the LPGA’s suspension and exclusion of 
the player from golf constituted a group boycott, and “[group boycotts are]  
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable restraints of trade, simply by virtue 
of their obvious and necessary effect on competition.”56  Although the LPGA 
                                                          
49. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016. 
50. See Blalock v. Ladies Prof’l Golf Ass’n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
51. Id. at 1262–63. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1263. 
54. Id. (citing Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971)). 
55. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1263. 
56. Id. at 1264 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)); see Fashion  
Originators’ Guild, Inc. of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467–68 (1941) (applying the per se rule of  
illegality to a concerted refusal to deal, or “group boycott”); see also E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. 
Consol. Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that when a group boycott 
creates exclusionary or coercive conduct, the arrangement is a “naked restraint of trade” and application 
of the per se rule is justified). 
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argued that, like Molinas v. National Basketball Ass’n57 and Deesen v.  
Professional Golfers' Ass’n of America,58 the rule of reason should apply to 
sports industry self-regulation, the court noted that those cases “did not involve 
a completely unfettered, subjective and discretionary determination of an  
exclusionary sanction by a tribunal wholly composed of competitors . . . .”59  
Thus, the court concluded that the per se rule applied and the LPGA’s  
suspension violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.60  
While Blalock is one case that has applied the per se approach and held that 
a sport association’s disciplinary action constituted an illegal group boycott, 
other courts have also recognized this analysis in the sports context.61  For  
example, in Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, although the court 
found that the NCAA’s actions did not constitute a group boycott, the court did 
state that “[s]ports organizations have not been given unlimited discretion in 
adopting rules and regulations.”62  In making this statement, the court  
recognized that sport organizations “have been subjected to treatment under the 
per se rule when the purpose of a regulation is to eliminate business competition 
. . . or when the regulation does not satisfy the basic tenets of procedural  
fairness.”63  
In recognizing the application of the per se rule to sports industry  
self-regulations that lack procedural safeguards, the court in Justice  
acknowledged Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.64 and elaborated 
on its holding.65  In Denver Rockets, the court held that a rule, which prohibited 
any team of the National Basketball Association (NBA) from drafting a player 
who graduated high school in the last four years, was an illegal group boycott 
under the per se rule.66  In reaching this decision, the court noted that the per se 
rule applies to group boycotts, unless the sports organization’s regulation meets 
a three-prong test: 
                                                          
57. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
58. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966). 
59. Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1267–68. 
60. Id. at 1268. 
61. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group  
Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 631, 647–49 (2009). 
62. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
63. Id. (referencing M & H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 560 F. Supp. 591, 604 (D. 
Mass. 1983); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Conn. 1977); Blalock, 
359 F. Supp. at 1264–68; Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064–65 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971)). 
64. 325 F. Supp. at 1049. 
65. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 380–82. 
66. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1059, 1066. 
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(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation “or  
otherwise.”  In discussing the history of the New York Stock 
Exchange in Silver, the Court suggests that self-regulation is 
inherently required by the market's structure.  From this basis, 
it has been argued that where collective action is required by 
the industry structure, it falls within the “or otherwise”  
provision of Silver. 
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end 
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is  
reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive 
than necessary. 
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which  
assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a  
basis for judicial review.67 
 
If the sports organization can show that the regulation meets the  
three-prong test above, then the group boycott is not per se illegal and the rule 
of reason analysis should be applied.68  
In applying this three-prong test to the NBA’s four-year rule, the court noted 
that there is no provision in the NBA’s constitution or by-laws “for even the 
most rudimentary hearing before the four-year college rule is applied . . . . 
[or] any provision whereby an individual player might petition for consideration 
of his specific case.”69  Thus, due to the lack of basic procedural safeguards, 
such as an opportunity to be heard, the court held that the NBA rule did not meet 
the three-prong test and was a per se illegal group boycott.70 
Although Blalock, Justice, and Denver Rockets are the main cases that have 
analyzed and recognized the application of the per se approach to rules and  
by-laws of sports organizations that lack procedural safeguards, there are a  
number of cases that have taken a similar approach to sports industry  
self-regulation.71  For example, the court in Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n 
applied the three-prong approach to the World Hockey Association’s  
twenty-year-old age minimum and held that the rule was a per se illegal group 
                                                          
67. Id. at 1064–65 (citing Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (recognizing an exception 
to the per se illegality of group boycotts and allowed a group boycott to be analyzed under the rule of 
reason)) (citation omitted). 
68. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064. 
69. Id. at 1066. 
70. Id. 
71. Edelman, supra note 61, at 647–49. 
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boycott due to the lack of procedural safeguards for the prospective players and 
the arbitrariness of the rule.72  Similarly, in the context of disciplinary rules, 
although the court in Brenner v. World Boxing Council held that the disciplinary 
action was reasonable, the court recognized the application of the three-prong 
test when it stated, “[a]bsent a facial showing of anticompetitive purpose  
underlying the adoption or enforcement of a rule, the disciplinary activity of a 
sports organization must be evaluated under either the [three-prong test] or the 
rule of reason.”73 
While these cases demonstrate the application of the three-prong test to 
sports, this test has also been recognized in a non-sports context.  For example, 
the court in McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass’n held that a  
private professional association’s suspension of its member constituted a group 
boycott and failed the three-prong test because the association had a complete 
monopoly over the “purebred Black Aberdeen Angus” market and the  
suspension lacked “even the most basic and elemental requirements of a fair 
hearing.”74 
As shown by the cases above, courts tend to apply the per se rule to group 
boycotts when a regulation lacks procedural safeguards that would prevent  
competitors from disciplining each other75 or from receiving basic due  
process.76  This result is not surprising as some states, such as California, have 
adopted a common law right to procedural safeguards, known as the fair  
procedure doctrine, when a private association’s disciplinary action would  
affect a member’s livelihood.77  
In the context of the Center, if a coach were to be found guilty of sexual 
misconduct, the Center could expel and permanently ban the coach from the 
sport.  Further, since all NGB certified clubs are prohibited from employing a 
banned coach or allowing a banned coach to interact with athletes at  
competitions, a permanent ban would be considered a group boycott under the 
above cases.  However, if the Center can meet the three-prong test, the sanction 
will escape the per se rule and will be analyzed under the rule of reason—a more 
complex standard.   
In applying the three-prong test to the Center, the first prong will be  
satisfied because self-regulation is inherently required in the sports industry.  As 
                                                          
72. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321–23 (D. Conn. 1977). 
73. Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 455 (2d Cir. 1982). 
74. McCreery Angus Farms v. Am. Angus Ass’n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1019 (S.D. Ill. 1974). 
75. See Blalock v. Ladies Prof’l Golf Ass’n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1267–68 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
76. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321–23; McCreery Angus Farms, 379 F. Supp. at 1019; Denver 
Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
77. Elizabeth L. Crooke, Practice Tips: Applicability of the Fair Procedure Doctrine, 32 L.A. LAW. 
18 (2009); see generally Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160 (1969). 
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for the second prong, a permanent ban would be intended to accomplish an end 
consistent with preventing sexual abuse, and would be reasonably related to that 
goal by preventing a coach from having contact with athletes.   
However, for the third element—no more extensive than necessary—of the 
second prong, is difficult to predict.  On one hand, a permanent banishment may 
be necessary to prevent a sexual predator from having access to young athletes.  
On the other hand, a permanent ban may be found too extensive as our justice 
system for criminal conduct is based on a belief of rehabilitation—even some 
criminals are eventually released and allowed to work again.   
For the third prong, if the Center adopts procedures similar to the current 
SafeSport policy—notice, hearing, right to appeal, unbiased hearing officer, 
guidelines for degree of discipline—the third prong will most likely be met.  
However, it is important to emphasize that the Center will have the power to 
impose exclusionary self-regulation unlike any sport regulation courts have  
addressed before.  This is because unlike cases involving the NCAA or  
professional sports, the Center’s sole purpose is to investigate and discipline 
members for criminal conduct that is usually left to local law enforcement.  With 
its sole purpose so distinct from other exclusionary self-regulation in the sports 
industry, a court may require a heightened degree of procedural safeguards  
compared to cases that have required only basic notice and hearing procedures 
to avoid the per se rule.  Thus, the adoption of sufficient procedural safeguards 
will be important if the Center is to avoid classification of its sanctions as per 
se illegal group boycotts. 
While the per se rule established by the above cases may be applicable to 
the Center, there have been significant developments in case law since those 
cases were decided that favor the rule of reason approach and makes the  
application of the per se rule to the sports industry unclear.  For example, the 
court in United States Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago Downs Ass’n stated that, “in 
the context of organized sports and sanctioning organizations, courts should be 
hesitant to fasten upon tags such as ‘group boycott’ and ‘per se’ in order to 
preclude inquiry into the business necessity for or precise harm occasioned by 
particular rules or practices.”78  Further, the court in Brant v. United States  
Polo Ass’n, in recognizing a Supreme Court decision that held that a restraint is 
not per se illegal based solely on a lack of procedural safeguards, stated that 
“[t]he most [a] Plaintiff could argue . . . would be that the lack of procedural 
due process and fair play in the suspension process . . . evidences an  
anticompetitive motive or intent.”79  Thus, this analysis of the Center’s  
                                                          
78. U.S. Trotting Ass’n v. Chi. Downs Ass’n, 665 F.2d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Am. 
Kennel Club, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (alteration in original). 
79. Brant v. U.S. Polo Ass’n, 631 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 
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disciplinary rules under section 1 must turn to the rule of reason approach in 
examining the legality of the Center’s enforcement. 
 
2. Rule of Reason 
 
In applying the rule of reason, a court must analyze a restraint’s effect on 
competition through a burden shifting proof.80  To explain this burden shifting 
framework, the court in Law v. NCAA stated: 
 
[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an  
agreement had a substantially adverse effect on competition.  If 
the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the  
defendant to come forward with evidence of the procompetitive 
virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct.  If the defendant is able 
to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then must 
prove that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary 
to achieve the legitimate objectives or that those objectives can 
be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.   
Ultimately, if these steps are met, the harms and benefits must 
be weighed against each other in order to judge whether the 
challenged behavior is . . . reasonable.81 
 
Given the in-depth analysis and balancing test that the rule of reason  
offers, courts have shown a preference for the application of the rule of reason 
over the per se rule when it comes to sports organizations.  This can be seen in 
Justice, where the court analyzed an NCAA rule that prohibited schools from  
compensating athletes.82  After applying the rule of reason and finding the 
NCAA’s sanction reasonable, the court noted that “actions by sports  
organizations in preserving the integrity of the sport and fair competition are 
reasonable restraints under the rule of reason, even if they operate to exclude 
some competitors and thus have an incidental anticompetitive effect.”83 
This preference was further clarified in the landmark case of NCAA v. Board 
of Regents, which held that the application of the per se rule to the NCAA’s 
                                                          
Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985) (holding that “no lack of procedural 
protections would convert [a section 1 violation] into a per se violation.”). 
80. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998). 
81. Id. (citations omitted). 
82. Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382–83 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
83. Id. at 382 n.17. 
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horizontal restraint was inappropriate.84  Although the Court recognized that the 
per se rule is typically applied to horizontal price fixing, the Court stated that:  
 
This decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience with 
this type of arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA is  
organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our respect for the 
NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of 
intercollegiate amateur athletics.  Rather, what is critical is that 
this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at 
all.85 
 
As emphasized, the Supreme Court has taken a preference to the rule of 
reason in the context of sports, and the significance of this position has been 
noted by other courts.  As explained by the court in Blubaugh v. American  
Contract Bridge League, “[w]hen the trade allegedly being restrained concerns 
a competitive sport, . . . the per se rule creates problems because the competition 
would be impossible without collective agreements among competitors about 
the rules of the competition and enforcement of those rules.”86   
In recognizing the Supreme Court’s position, courts have since generally 
analyzed “cases involving restrictions in sports and other competitive leagues 
under the rule of reason.”87  This can be seen in Law, where the court applied 
the rule of reason analysis to an NCAA rule that limited the amount of  
compensation certain coaches could receive.88  After applying the rule of  
reason, the court held that the NCAA’s rule violated section 1 because it failed 
to produce a procompetitive justification that would enhance competition in  
intercollegiate sport.89   
Although the above cases dealt with NCAA rules, courts have also applied 
the rule of reason to other sport organizations and their disciplinary rules.  For 
example, in Molinas v. National Basketball Ass’n, where an athlete was  
disciplined for gambling on sports, the court noted that “[s]urely, every  
disciplinary rule which a league may invoke, although by its nature it may  
                                                          
84. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984). 
85. Id. (emphasis added). 
86. Blubaugh v. Am. Contract Bridge League, No. IP 01-358-C H/K, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3178, 
*43 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 2004). 
87. Id.  See Kelly M. Vaughan, Note, First and Goal: How the NFL's Personal Conduct Policy 
Complies with Federal Antitrust Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 628 (2011). 
88. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019–24 (10th Cir. 1998). 
89. Id. at 1020. 
FIORENZA 27.1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2016  5:57 PM 
2016] SAFE SPORT’S DISCIPL INARY POLICY  129 
involve some sort of a restraint, does not run afoul of the anti-trust laws.”90  
After making this notation, the court held that “a disciplinary rule invoked 
against gambling seems about as reasonable a rule as could be imagined.”91 
In addition to Molinas, a disciplinary rule for use of certain drugs has also 
been found reasonable under the rule of reason.92  In Cooney v. American Horse 
Shows Ass’n, the court noted that “disciplinary action can be considered  
unreasonably anticompetitive in effect only if the regulation is enforced in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or where the restraint is broader than  
reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate goal of the regulation.”93  
Thus, after finding that the disciplinary rule did not violate the above standard, 
the court held that the rule was not an unreasonable restraint in violation of 
 section 1.94 
Lastly, the court in Brant, where a polo player was disciplined for  
violating league rules by verbally abusing the umpire, also held that a  
disciplinary rule for in-game misconduct was reasonable under the rule of  
reason.95  In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that “a sports rule  
designed to proscribe ‘intentionally or carelessly dangerous, abusive, hostile or 
disorderly’ conduct is facially neutral, and quite apparently designed and  
intended to preserve the integrity of the game itself . . . .”96  Thus, the court held 
that the rule was procompetitive and reasonable under the rule of reason test.97 
In applying the rule of reason to the Center, its disciplinary action will most 
likely be found reasonable.  Based on the above cases, disciplinary rules that are 
designed to preserve the integrity of the sport—drug rules, in-game misconduct 
rules, anti-sports gambling rules—and that are applied in a non-arbitrary or  
discriminatory manner have been found procompetitive and reasonable under 
the rule of reason.  However, if the disciplinary rule is applied arbitrarily or 
discriminatorily, and there was a lack of procedural safeguards to prevent such 
application, a court might find that the anti-competitive effects outweigh any 
procompetitive justifications.  Thus, for the Center’s disciplinary action to be 
found reasonable under the rule of reason, the Center must not enforce its rules 
or issue sanctions, such as a permanent ban, in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
manner. 
                                                          
90. Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
91. Id. 
92. Cooney v. Am. Horse Shows Ass’n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 431–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
93. Id. at 431. 
94. Id. at 431–33. 
95. Brant v. U.S. Polo Ass’n, 631 F. Supp. 71, 76–77 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
96. Id. at 76. 
97. Id. at 76–77. 
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V. PER SE OR RULE OF REASON: WHICH ONE SHOULD APPLY 
 
As discussed in the rule of reason section, courts have been hesitant to  
label sports industry self-regulation under the categories of “per se” or “group  
boycott.”  Thus, a banned coach would have an uphill battle to persuade a court 
that a permanent ban by the Center is per se illegal or an illegal group boycott.  
However, while this would be a difficult argument, it is not an impossible  
argument.  As stated previously, the Center will not be like any other sports 
entity that courts have previously analyzed under section 1. 
When the Supreme Court established a preference for the rule of reason, it 
did so by stating that “horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
product is to be available at all.”98  Further, courts have since continued to  
apply this reasoning to a number of association rules—amateurism rules, drug 
testing rules, in-game misconduct rule, sport gambling rules, etc.—because 
those rules were held to be related to the functionality or substance of the sport, 
or to preserving the integrity of the sport.  Thus, the rules were held essential 
for the sport to be available. 
However, the rules established by the Center are not “essential for the sport 
to be available” because they do not relate to the functionality or substance of 
the sport.  Rather, the Center seeks to expand the criminal justice system by 
investigating and disciplining members for criminal misconduct, even if the 
criminal justice system found no guilt.  By assuming the role of the criminal 
justice system, the Center’s disciplinary rules become distinct from any other 
“essential” rules courts have recognized because the Center seeks to enforce 
rules that are already sovereign laws—with their own adjudication.  Further, 
while it could be argued that these disciplinary rules established by the Center 
relate to the integrity of the sport, courts have only upheld integrity rules when 
the rule seeks to preserve the integrity or nature of the game, not rules that relate 
to actions by members that occur outside of the sport and do not affect the game 
itself. 
Due to these distinctions, it is not a forgone conclusion that the Center’s 
disciplinary action will be analyzed under the rule of reason.  Rather, the  
argument for classifying its disciplinary action as a group boycott can be made 
due to the uniqueness of the Center’s authority, the breadth of the Center’s  
disciplinary rules, and the severity a permanent ban would have on a coach’s 
livelihood.  Further, although the Supreme Court has held that a restraint is not 
per se illegal based solely on a lack of procedural safeguards, courts have  
continued to examine procedural safeguards as a factor because a lack of  
                                                          
98. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (emphasis added). 
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procedural safeguards can produce arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, 
which is anti-competitive.  Thus, due to the severity a sexual misconduct  
sanction can have on a coach’s livelihood, courts will most likely scrutinize how 
the rules are enforced (like in the group boycott cases) to ensure that the rule is 
not applied arbitrarily and to minimize the risk that an accused coach is  
innocent. 
However, given the preference for the rule of reason, the argument for per 
se treatment will be a stretch and it should be anticipated that a court will  
apply the rule of reason analysis.  In applying the rule of reason to the Center’s  
disciplinary rules and searching for anti-competitive effects, a court’s decision 
on the reasonableness of the rule will come down to whether the Center adopts 
enough procedural safeguards to prevent a permanent ban from being enforced 
arbitrarily in an anti-competitive manner—such as requiring an unbiased,  
conflict-free hearing officer and establishing a list of factors for determining the 
sanction’s severity. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Once created, the new Center will play an essential role in preventing  
sexual abuse within Olympic sports.  Through its ability to investigate and  
discipline any claims of misconduct within any of the forty-seven NGBs, the 
Center stands in a position to affect real change within the culture of Olympic 
sports.  However, with this power comes certain risks.  More specifically, the 
risk that a disciplined coach will allege that the Center’s disciplinary rules  
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.   
While it is unlikely that a coach could successfully bring a section 1 claim 
due to the thorough procedures the Center plans to adopt, it remains a risk that 
the Center must remain aware of.  To help minimize this risk, the Center must 
structure its enforcement procedures in a manner that would ensure that its rules 
are not enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.  As shown in the 
above cases, the only time that courts have found a Sherman Act violation for 
enforcing a disciplinary rule has been when the organization has lacked basic 
procedural safeguards.  Thus, by adopting procedures sufficient to prevent  
sanctions from being applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily, the risk of an  
innocent coach bringing a successful section 1 claim will be greatly alleviated. 
 
